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21 Introduction
A classical group decision making problem is established in a context where a group of
voters or experts have to make a decision on a set of alternatives or candidates. The
experts’ opinions about alternatives are usually characterized by their ideas, principles,
knowledge, etc. and this fact causes difficulties when it comes to making a collective
decision or select one alternative or candidate. In this paper we focus on measuring
the degree of agreement between the voters and the final decision reached via voting
systems.
Suppose the case of a (finite) committee that intends to offer vacancies to a (finite)
list of candidates. Each member is assumed to produce a complete preorder on the
candidates, that is, ties are allowed. For various plausible reasons the committee wants
to agree on a complete preorder of the candidates, for example because the candidates
may reject the offer, or because the number of candidates to be appointed is externally
and independently decided. It is intuitively clear that some orderings convey “higher
consensus” than others, whatever the formal meaning that we attach to that term.
We here propose a model that considers both aspects of the process, namely, the
social preference on the alternatives and the consensus that arises from it. Generally
speaking, the question we pose ourselves is: How should the design be for the committee
to reach a consistent decision (in the form of a complete preorder on the candidates)
with regard to favouring consensus? This issue is linked to different branches of the
social choice literature. Firstly, voting rules come to mind as a well-established tool to
reach a decision. Secondly, the measurement of consensus must be introduced in the
analysis.
Regarding the latter problem we separate from the main trend in the literature,
that consists of proposing and axiomatizing particular formulations for an absolute
measure of consensus or coherence (v., e.g., Bosch [4] or Alcalde and Vorsatz [2]). We
here provide an alternative methodology for approaching the measurement of consen-
sus, which we call referenced consensus measures. In agreement with the discussion
above, it can be specialized via two ways: the “voting rule” that is selected, and the
measure of agreement between profiles and orderings. We prove that this model permits
to unify all the approaches to measure consensus in the sense of the aforementioned
literature. Then we perform a descriptive analysis of its formal properties with a special
emphasis on a subclass of it –that we call normal referenced consensus measures– and
particularly on two relevant cases whose explicit constructions are detailed. Adopting
this latter position has several advantages. It gives a single and practical solution to a
problem, which permits to compare proposals on the basis of the consensus that they
yield and therefore favours descriptive analyses. Also, in view of the behavior of the
general classes that we study one can conclude that the performance of this solution is
sufficiently good to value it as a decision aiding tool.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to introduce basic notation
and definitions, as well as our proposal of measurement of consensus, the referenced con-
sensus measure. We prove that it incorporates the usual model by consensus measures.
Then we propose the particular subclass of normal referenced consensus measures as a
suitable framework where a better normative behavior can be guaranteed. In Section
3 operational characterizations of some focal voting rules are provided, which helps us
to deal with the two explicit proposals for measurement of consensus that we present.
Also we perform a short analysis of the dichotomous case. In Section 4 we explore a
list of appealing properties of normal referenced consensus measures, and particularly
3of our explicit proposals. Finally, in Section 5 we give some concluding remarks and
pose questions for further research.
2 Notation and Definitions
We fix X = {x1, ..., xk}, a finite set of k options, alternatives or candidates. Abusing
notation, on occasions we refer to option xs as option s for convenience. A population
of agents or voters is a finite subset N = {1, 2, ..., N} of natural numbers. We also
denote K = {{i, j} ⊆ N : i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, i 6= j}.
Let W (X) be the set of weak orders or complete preorders on X, that is, the set
of complete and transitive binary relations on X. If R ∈ W (X) is a weak order on X
that reflects the preferences of a voter, then by xkRxj we mean “R-voter thinks that
alternative xk is at last as good as xj”. L(X) denotes the set of linear orders on X.
A profile R = (R1, . . . , RN ) ∈ W (X)× N.... ×W (X) is a vector of weak orders,
where Ri ∈ W (X) represents the preferences of the individual i on the k alternatives
or candidates for each i = 1, . . . , N . The reversal of the profile R, denoted by R−1,
is the profile (R−11 , ..., R
−1
N ) where xsR
−1
i xt ⇔ xtRi xs for each possible voter i ∈
{1, . . . , N} and candidates or alternatives xs, xt ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We say that the profile
R is constant to R if R = (R, N......, R).
Any permutation σ of the voters {1, 2, ..., N} determines a permutation of R by
Rσ = (Rσ(1), ......, Rσ(N)). Similarly, any permutation pi of the candidates {1, 2, ..., k}
determines a permutation of every complete preorder R ∈ W (X) via xs piRi xt ⇔
xpi−1(s)Ri xpi−1(t) for all s, t ∈ {1, . . . , k} and i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then with R and pi we
can associate piR = (piR1, ......,pi RN ).
Finally, given any profile of weak orders R = (R1, . . . , RN ) ∈ W (X)N and any
weak order R′ on X, we denote R unionmulti R′ the profile (R1, . . . , RN , R′) of N + 1 weak
orders. We denote by P(X) the set of all profiles, that is, P(X) = ⋃N>2W (X)N .
2.1 Basic Definitions
A Consensus measure with reference to a consensus function (henceforth, referenced
consensus measure, RCM for simplicity, when the consensus function is common knowl-
edge) is a pair M = (C, ∂) where:
1) C is a consensus function (cf., McMorris and Powers, 2009), that is, a mapping
C : P(X)→W (X),
that associates a complete preorder C(R) with each profile of complete preorders
R. We speak of the consensus preorder C(R) associated with R, and assume that
1.a) C(R) = R for each profile R that is constant to the complete preorder R.
1.b) C(Rσ) = C(R) for each profile of complete preorders and σ permutation of the
voters.
1.c) C(piR) =pi C(R) for each profile of complete preorders and pi permutation of
the candidates or alternatives.
Abusing notation, this can be replaced with a voting rule with suitable properties:
for example, 1.b) and 1.c) just mean the usual anonymity and neutrality conditions,
respectively.
4Example 1 A tie-breaking Borda rule as given by Suzumura [9, pp. 107-108] at-
taches a complete preorder to each profile of complete preorders. It ranks the can-
didates according to their respective Borda score defined as follows:
β(xs) =
N∑
i=1
(#{xt ∈ X : xsRi xt } −#{xt ∈ X : xtRi xs})
Because 1.a), 1.b) and 1.c) are immediate, we denote by CB such consensus function.
If in fact we have a profile of linear orders the same ranking is obtained through
the alternative Borda score given by:
β′(xs) =
N∑
i=1
(#{xt ∈ X : xsRi xt })
Example 2 The Copeland method is described in e.g., Saari and Merlin [8] or Suzu-
mura [9, p. 108]. It ranks the candidates according to their respective Copeland
score defined as follows:
κ(xs) = #{xt ∈ X : xs beats xt by s.s.m.} −#{xt ∈ X : xt beats xs by s.s.m.}
where s.s.m. stands for “strict simple majority”. This rule is widely used in tour-
nament situations, and versions of it are adopted by sports leagues. Again, 1.a),
1.b) and 1.c) are immediate. We denote by CC its associated consensus function.
2) ∂ is a referenced measure function (RMF), that is, a mapping
∂ : P(X)×W (X)→ [0, 1],
that assigns a real number, ∂(R, R) ∈ [0, 1], to each pair of a profile of complete
preorder R, and a complete preorder R, with the following properties:
2.a) ∂(R, R) = 1 if and only if R is constant to R.
2.b) ∂(Rσ, R) = ∂(R, R) for each possible permutation σ of the voters.
2.c) ∂(piR,pi R) = ∂(R, R) for each possible permutation pi of the candidates.
With regard to M = (C, ∂) each profile of complete preorders R on X has a consensus
∇M(R) = ∂(R, C(R)).
It is important to observe that each conventional consensus measure can be in-
trepreted as a referenced consensus measure, in the following sense. Recall first that a
consensus measure (cf., Bosch [4]) is a mapping:
M : P → [0, 1]
that assigns a real number M(R) to each profile of complete preorder R with the
following properties:
– M(R) = 1 if and only if R is a constant profile.
– M(Rσ) =M(R) for each permutation σ of the voters.
– M(piR) =M(R) for each permutation pi of the candidates.
5Then, given a consensus measure M we define its associated RMF as
∂M(R, R) =
{M(RunionmultiR) if R is constant,
M(R) otherwise.
Now it is straightforward to check:
– ∂M satisfies 2.a), 2.b) and 2.c)
– For any C consensus function ∂M(R, C(R)) =M(R).
In conclusion, for every consensus measureM, any RCM (C, ∂M) associated with it is
equivalent to M irrespective of C, in the sense that both M and (C, ∂M) produce the
same number as a measure of the consensus in the society. Note that contrary to the
spirit of our proposal, the role of C(R) is irrelevant in the previous construction. In
order to enhance the influence of C(R) in the consensus measure we now demand an
additional property to referenced measure functions and introduce the corresponding
new subclass of consensus measures:
Definition 1 (Normal Referenced Consensus Measure) A referenced consensus
measure M = (C, ∂) is called normal if its referenced measure function ∂ verifies
2.d) ∂(R, R) > 0 if R ∈ R.
If we adopt the position that overall satisfaction is an aggregate of individual satis-
faction then property 2.d) can be regarded as natural. We emphasize that the subclass
of normal referenced consensus measures does not include all the conventional ones.
For example, the trivial measure defined as
T (R) =
{
1 if R is a constant profile,
0 otherwise,
is not a normal RCM. Note that we can assume that there exists a non-constant profile
R such that C(R) ∈ R (this forcefully holds e.g., when the number of voters is higher
than the cardinality of W (X)). Since T (R) = 0 and ∂(R, C(R)) > 0 for any normal
RCM we conclude the assertion.
We now propose a construction of RMFs based on conventional consensus measures,
which verifies property 2.d). LetM be a consensus measure. Given a profile of complete
preorders R and a complete preorder R we define the µp(M)-RFM as the p-generalized
mean of the RN vector that has the i-th component equal to M(Ri unionmultiR), that is
∂pM(R, R) =
(
N∑
i=1
1
N
M(Ri unionmultiR)p
)1/p
(1)
It is trivial to check that properties 2.a), 2.b), 2.c) and 2.d) hold true. We conclude this
part with an example.
Example 3 Let us first recall the definition of Kemeny’s measure. For every profile of
complete preorders R = (R1, . . . , RN ), its Kemeny’s measure K(R) is the probability
that the binary ordering between a pair of randomly selected alternatives is the same for
all voters. Given p = 1 and M = K –the Kemeny’s measure– the above construction
produces the following RMF. Attending to (1), we have to compute the Kemeny’s
measure of a profile composed by two elements: Ri that represents the preferences of
6individual i and R the referenced complete preorder. Observe that there is a total of
k(k−1)
2 possible random choices. Thus the proportion of pairwise comparisons where
Ri and R coincide is
K(Ri unionmultiR) = 2
k(k − 1)
∑
(s,t)∈K
Ks,t(Ri unionmultiR)
with
Ks,t(Ri unionmultiR) =

1 if Ri and R coincide on the binary comparison
between xs and xt;
0 otherwise.
We then conclude that the µ1(K)-RMF is given by:
∂1K(R, R) =
K(R1 unionmultiR) + . . .+K(RN unionmultiR)
N
.
Convention 1 In what follows we omit superscripts when they are 1, in particular we
denote the µ1(K)-RMF as ∂K.
Along the rest of the paper we restrict our attention to normal referenced consensus
measure with referenced measure function based on generalized means.
3 Some proposals for normal referenced consensus measures
In this section we detail the construction of two relevant normal RCM proposals. These
models reach the consensus decision with Borda and Copeland methods, respectively,
and both of them measure the consensus with the µ1(K)-RMF. We first provide an op-
erational characterizations of Borda and Copeland rules. We then analyse our proposals
and finally, we shortly discuss the dichotomous case.
3.1 Some Operational Characterizations
Let us fix a profile R = (R1, ..., RN ) of complete preorders on X. Its Borda and
Copeland scores can be reinterpreted in terms of simple matrix operations. We denote
by At the transpose of the matrix A. Besides, for any m × n real-valued matrix A =
(ai,j)m×n the notation sig(A) refers to the m×n matrix whose (i, j) cell is 1 if ai,j > 0,
−1 if ai,j < 0, and 0 otherwise. Ik denotes the identity matrix of size k × k.
For each complete preorder Rs, the asymmetric part of which is denoted by Ps, its
preference matrix Ps is defined as the k × k binary matrix whose (i, j) cell is 1 when
xi Ps xj , and 0 otherwise. Observe that Rs is linear if and only if Ps + (Ps)
t + Ik =
(1)k×k, the constant to 1 matrix of size k× k. Besides, the sum of the cells in the i-th
row of Ps − (Ps)t is #{xj ∈ X : xi Ps xj} −#{xj ∈ X : xj Ps xi}. We say that R
has an aggregate preference matrix A(R) = P1+ ...+PN . Its (i, j) cell has the number
of agents for which alternative xi is strictly better than xj . The sum of the cells in its
i-th row is the usual Borda score β′(xi) when R is a profile of linear orders.
Define A(R) = A(R)− (A(R))t, then the sum of the cells in its i-th file is β(xi),
the Borda score of alternative xi (v. Example 1).
7Observe that the fact that the (i, j) cell of A(R) is greater than 0 is equivalent
to the fact that alternative xi beats xj by strict simple majority under the profile R.
Thus if we define A˜(R) = sig(A(R)) then the sum of the cells in its i-th file is κ(xi),
the Copeland score of alternative xi (v. Example 2).
Example 4 Suppose X = {x, y, z, w} thus k = 4. Let R = (R1, R2, R3) be the profile
of linear orders given by: wP1 y P1 xP1 z, z P2 wP2 y P2 x, xP3 z P3 y P3 w.
Then
P1 =

0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0
 P2 =

0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0
 P3 =

0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0

Some simple computations yield
A(R) =

0 1 2 1
2 0 1 1
1 2 0 2
2 2 1 0
 A(R) = A˜(R) =

0 −1 1 −1
1 0 −1 −1
−1 1 0 1
1 1 −1 0

Thus for this setting the Borda and Copeland scores coincide throughout. Their values
are −1 por options x and y, and 1 for options z and w. Therefore the social preference
R that is derived from both choice rules is w I z P x I y (cf., Suzumura [9, p. 108]).
Calculating ∂K(R, R) for R = (R1, ..., RN ) profile of complete preorders and R
complete preorder is trivial from the numbers Ks,t(Ri unionmulti R). These amounts can be
computed with the assistance of basic matrix manipulations too. Denote by P the
preference matrix of R defined as above. Let us observe two facts.
1. Cell (s, t) of both Pi + (Pi)
t and P + Pt has a 0 if and only if both Ri and R are
indifferent between xs and xt. This can not happen when s 6= t if either Ri or R is
linear.
2. Cell (s, t) of both Pi and P has a 1 if and only if xs Pi xt and xs P xt .
This means that: the number of pairs of different options for which both Ri and
R are indifferent is the number of cells strictly above the diagonal with a 0 for both
Pi + (Pi)
t and P + Pt (and it is 0 if either Ri or R is linear); and the number of
pairs of options for which Ri and R have equal strict preference is the number of cells
(outside the diagonal) with a 1 for both Pi and P.
1 The sum of these two amounts is
k(k−1)
2 K(Ri, R) =
∑
{s,t}∈KKs,t(Riunionmulti, R).
Example 5 In the situation of Example 4 one has
P1 + P
t
1 = P2 + P
t
2 = P3 + P
t
3 =

0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0

1 This number is obtained with a computer assistant very easily: do the cell-by-cell multi-
plication and sum up all the cells in the result.
8because all P1, P2 and P3 are linear orders. The preference matrix of the complete
preorder R that is prescribed by both the Borda and Copeland rule is
P =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0

Some simple computations yield ∂K(R, R) = 13 ( 2+4+16 ) = 718 since
– No pair of different options is indifferent under any of the Pi’s.
– Only cells (4, 1) and (4, 2) have a 1 in both P1 and P.
– Only cells (3, 1), (3, 2), (4, 1) and (4, 2) have a 1 in both P2 and P.
– Only cell (3, 2) has a 1 in both P3 and P.
3.2 The RCM-B proposal
In this Subsection we analyse the referenced consensus measure given by the tie-
breaking Borda rule that was detailed in Example 1 and ∂K introduced in Example 3.
We refer to this model as RCM-B, that is, MB = (CB, ∂K).
Let us first show how this proposal produces its output with a simple Example.
Example 6 In the situation of Example 4 we checked that CB(R) is the complete pre-
order RB determined by w IB z PB x IB y. According to Example 5
∇MB (R) = ∂K(R, CB(R)) =
7
18
This means that 7 out of 18 =
3·4·(4−1)
2 possible pairwise comparisons made by a
member of the society {1, 2, 3} coincide with the binary ordering given by the consensus
function in the model.
3.3 The RCM-C proposal
In this Subsection we analyse the referenced consensus measure given by the Copeland
method (cf. Example 2) and ∂K. We refer to this model as RCM-C, that is, MC =
(CC , ∂K).
Let us first show how this proposal produces its output with a simple Example.
Example 7 In the situation of Example 4 (v. Example 6) we found CC(R) = RB thus
∇MC (R) = ∂K(R, CC(R)) =
7
18
Again, 7 out of 18 possible pairwise comparisons made by a member of the society
{1, 2, 3} coincide with the binary ordering given by the consensus function in the model.
93.4 The case of a dichotomous choice
Suppose k = 2, i.e., the dichotomous case. To simplify notation let X = {x, y}. We also
denote n1 = |{i ∈ N : xPi y}| and n2 = |{i ∈ N : y Pi x}|, thus N − n1 − n2 = |{i ∈
N : x Ii y}|. Due to properties 1.b) and 2.b) we can reorder the voters as convenient,
and we assume that voters 1, ..., n1 prefer x strictly over y, that voters n1+1, ..., n1+n2
prefer y strictly over x, and that the last N − n1 − n2 voters are indifferent between
x and y. Let nx,y(R) denote the majority margin of x over y under R, that is, the
number of voters that prefer x strictly over y minus the number of voters that prefer
y strictly over x, or nx,y(R) = n1 − n2. Now the Borda and Copeland voting rule
coincide with strict simple majority: the preference matrix of the complete preorder
R0 that is prescribed by them is
P0 =
(
0 1
0 0
)
if nx,y(R) > 0 (or n1 > n2)
P0 =
(
0 0
0 0
)
if nx,y(R) = 0 (or n1 = n2)
P0 =
(
0 0
1 0
)
if nx,y(R) < 0 (or n1 < n2)
Because k = 2 we obtain:
if n1 > n2, then K(Ri unionmultiR0) =
{
1 for i = 1, ..., n1
0 otherwise
if n2 > n1, then K(Ri unionmultiR0) =
{
1 for i = n1 + 1, ..., n1 + n2
0 otherwise
if n1 = n2, then K(Ri unionmultiR0) =
{
1 for i = n1 + n2 + 1, ..., N
0 otherwise
Therefore
∂K(R, R0) =

n1
N if n1 > n2
n2
N if n2 > n1
N−n1−n2
N = 1− 2n1N if n1 = n2
This means that under either RCM-B or RCM-C, total lack of consensus only happens
under a precise fifty-fifty division among all the voters (half prefer x strictly over y, half
the other way around), which is commonly agreed upon (see e.g., Alcalde and Vorsatz
[1, pp. 2-3]). Obviously when k = 2 and n1 +n2 = N (i.e., the dichotomous and binary
case) one has
∂K(R, R0) =

n1
N if n1 > n2
n2
N if n2 > n1
0 if n1 = n2
and an odd number of voters can not produce zero consensus under these models.
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4 Normal referenced consensus measures: a critical analysis of their
properties
Along this Section, M = (C, ∂pM) denotes a normal referenced consensus measure with
a µp(M)-RMF. In other words, ∂pM is based on a conventional consensus measure M
and computed as a p-generalized mean according to (1). We proceed to check that
such model agrees with certain axioms that are common use in the literature. At this
point we remark that Axioms 1 to 3 below hold true in the larger class of referenced
consensus measures. Finally, a critical analysis of other ad-hoc properties is performed
along this study.
4.1 Some properties of referenced consensus measures
The following axiom is trivial from the definition of a referenced consensus measure.
It means that maximum consensus is reached under commonly held preferences across
agents.
Axiom 1 M is unanimous if for each constant profile R it is true that ∇M(R) = 1.
Similarly, Proposition 1 below proves that the following property obtains:
Axiom 2 M is anonymous if for each permutation of the voters σ and each profile R,
it is true that ∇M(R) = ∇M(Rσ).
As is apparent, anonymity of a normal referenced consensus measure means that
the consensus measure does not change if we rename the voters.
Proposition 1 Any M is anonymous.
Proof This holds because M has properties 1.b) and 2.b). Specifically,
∇M(R) = ∂(R, C(R))
2.b)
= ∂(Rσ, C(R)) 1.b)= ∂(Rσ, C(Rσ)) = ∇M(Rσ)
uunionsq
In particular, both RCM-B and RCM-C satisfy Axiom 2. We now argue that normal
referenced consensus measures verify the following property too:
Axiom 3 M is neutral if the consensus measure does not change when we rename the
candidates.
Proposition 2 Any M is neutral.
Proof From the fact that the consensus function associated with M satisfies 1.c) it is
tedious but straightforward to check that M verifies Axiom 3. uunionsq
In order to introduce a further property of normal referenced consensus measures,
we first give some notation. For each profile R = (R1, ..., RN ) and m ∈ N we denote
mR = (R1,m..., R1, R2,m..., R2, ..., RN ,m..., RN )
that we call an m-replication of the profile R. Then we say that the consensus function
C verifies replication if C(R) = C(mR) throughout. This means that for each fixed
society, the same consensus ordering is proposed if we repeatedly clone it. Likewise we
define:
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Axiom 4 M verifies the replication axiom if for each profile R and m ∈ N it is true
that ∇M(R) = ∇M(mR).
Coupled with Axiom 2, this property is the analogous of the replication axiom in
Alcalde and Vorsatz [1].2 They interpret it as an invariance property asking that exact
replications of a society are attached the same level of coherence as the original. The
following result checks the model under inspection against Axiom 4:
Proposition 3 Given M = (C, ∂pM), if C verifies replication then M satisfies the
replication axiom.
Proof Let us fix a profile R = (R1, ..., RN ) and m ∈ N. By definition of mR, it is clear
that for any complete peorder R one has
∂pM(
mR, R) =
(∑N
i=1M(Ri unionmultiR)p+ m... +
∑N
i=1M(Ri unionmultiR)p
m ·N
)p
=
(∑N
i=1M(Ri unionmultiR)p
N
)p
= ∂pM(R, R).
Thus because C satisfies replication we finally obtain
∇M(mR) = ∂pM(R, C(mR)) = ∂pM(R, C(R)) = ∇M(R).
uunionsq
Corollary 1 Both RCM-B and RCM-C verify the replication axiom.
Proof By Proposition 3 it suffices to prove that both Borda and Copeland rankings
satisfy replication. Let us fix a profile R = (R1, ..., RN ) and m ∈ N. We observe that
because A(mR) = m ·A(R) and A(mR) = m ·A(R) the Borda ranking is preserved by
m-replication of the profile. Further, the fact that A˜(R) = sig(A(R)) = sig(A(mR)) =
A˜(mR) implies that the Copeland ranking is preserved by m-replication of the profile.
uunionsq
The next Axiom captures the intuitively appealing property that the consensus
measure should not change if all the agents simultaneously reverse their orderings of
the alternatives:
Axiom 5 M verifies reversal invariance if the reversal of any profile R, namely R−1,
produces the same consensus, i.e.,
∇M(R) = ∇M(R−1) for each possible profile R
To discuss this property, we have to introduce some additional notations. A consensus
function C satifies the reversal property if C(R−1) = C(R)−1 for any complete peorder
R. This means that when all voters in a profile reverse their rankings of the candidates
then the outcome is reversed. A consensus measure M verifies the reversal property
if M(R−1) = M(R) for any profile of complete preorders. That is, the consensus
measure is unchanged when the profile is reversed. Let us analyse this property in
detail.
2 These authors acknowledge inspiration by the scale invariance axiom in Allison’s [3] char-
acterization of the Gini index.
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Proposition 4 Given M = (C, ∂pM), if C and M verify the reversal property, then M
satisfies the reversal invariance axiom.
Proof Since (Ri unionmulti C(R))−1 = R−1i unionmulti C(R)−1, by hypotesis we infer for all i = 1 . . . N
that
M(Ri unionmulti C(R)) =M((Ri unionmulti C(R))−1) =M(R−1i unionmulti C(R)−1) =M(R−1i unionmulti C(R−1)),
and thus from definition of µp(M)-RMF we conclude as follow
∇M(R) = ∂pM(R, C(R)) = ∂pM(R−1, C(R−1)) = ∇M(R−1).
uunionsq
Our particular proposals in Section 3 verify this property too.
Corollary 2 Both RCM-B and RCM-C verify the reversal invariance axiom.
Proof Because the Borda and the Copeland rules satisfy the reversal property (cf., Saari
and Merlin [8, Section 1]) we only have to prove that the Kemeny’s measure verifies the
reversal property. This is straightfoward since Ks,t(Ri unionmulti C(R)) = Ks,t(R−1i unionmulti C(R−1))
for each possible voter i and candidates s and t. uunionsq
We now investigate if normal referenced consensus measures verify the following
reinforcement property:
Axiom 6 M verifies reinforcement if adding C(R) to the profile R does not reduce the
consensus, i.e.,
∇M(Runionmulti C(R)) > ∇M(R) for each possible profile R
We proceed to state a criterion for satisfaction of this property that depends upon the
behavior of C, and then we check that both RCM-B and RCM-C meet such criterion.
We say that a consensus function C verifies decision invariance if C(RunionmultiC(R)) = C(R)
for each profile R. This means that the consensus ordering does not change if we add
to the society a new agent whose preferences coincide with the previous consensus
preorder. Under this restriction we obtain:
Proposition 5 Given M = (C, ∂pM), if C verifies decision invariance then M verifies
reinforcement.
Proof Since C(Runionmulti C(R)) = C(R), and using M(C(R) unionmulti C(R)) = 1, one has
∇M(Runionmulti C(R)) = ∂pM(Runionmulti C(R), C(R))
=
(∑N
i=1M(Ri, C(R))p +M(C(R), C(R))p
N + 1
)1/p
=
(
N
N + 1
[
∂pM(R, C(R))
]p
+
1
N + 1
)1/p
> ∂pM(R, C(R)) = ∇M(R),
where the last inequality derives from the fact ∇M(R) 6 1. Such inequality becomes
strict provided ∇M(R) < 1. uunionsq
An appeal to Proposition 5 permits us to prove that both RCM-B and RCM-C
verify reinforcement:
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Proposition 6 RCM-B and RCM-C verify reinforcement.
Proof We just need to prove that their respective consensus functions verify the decision
invariance property which in conjunction with Proposition 5, proves the assertion.
Firstly we analyse RCM-B. Let us take the profile R and denote RB = CB(R) with
preference matrix PB . Recall that for A(R) = A(R)−(A(R))t, the sum of the cells in
its i-th file is β(xi), the Borda score of alternative xi. We claim CB(RunionmultiCB(R)) = CB(R).
These orders arise from the respective Borda scores, namely βB and β, obtained from
A(R unionmulti CB(R)) and A(R) by summing up the cells in their rows. Observe A(R unionmulti
CB(R)) = A(R) + PB − (PB)t. By construction β(xi) > β(xj) if and only if xiRB xj .
Because the sum of the cells in the i-th row of PB − (PB)t is #{xl ∈ X : xi PB xl}−
#{xl ∈ X : xl PB xi}, one has that xiRB xj if and only if the sum of the cells in the
i-th row of PB − (PB)t is greater or equal than the sum of the cells in the j-th row
of PB − (PB)t. This proves our claim βB(xi) > βB(xj) if and only if β(xi) > β(xj)
throughout.
We now analyse RCM-C. Let us take the profile R and denote RC = CC(R) with
preference matrix PC . Recall that for A˜(R) = sig(A(R)), the sum of the cells in its i-
th file is κ(xi), the Copeland score of alternative xi. We claim CC(RunionmultiCC(R)) = CC(R).
These orders arise from the respective Copeland scores, namely κc and κ, obtained from
A˜(Runionmulti CC(R)) and A˜(R) by summing up the cells in their rows. Thus our claim boils
down to κc(xi) > κc(xj) if and only if κ(xi) > κ(xj) throughout. This holds if we
prove sig(A(RunionmultiCC(R))) = sig(A(R)). Observe A(RunionmultiCC(R)) = A(R)+PC−(PC)t.
By construction κ(xi) > κ(xj) if and only if xiRC xj . Because cell (i, j) in A(R) is
positive (resp., negative) if and only if xi beats xj by s.s.m. (resp., xj beats xi by
s.s.m.) if and only if cell (i, j) in PC − (PC)t is positive (resp., negative), the claim
sig(A(Runionmulti CC(R))) = sig(A(R)) easily follows from a cell-by-cell inspection. uunionsq
In order to prove another interesting property of a suitable subclass of normal refer-
enced consensus measures we need some previous elaboration. The consensus function
C verifies responsiveness if for every R′ ∈ W (X) and R ∈ W (X)N , the following
equality holds eventually (i.e., for all sufficiently large m):
C(RunionmultiR′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′) = R′ (2)
We proceed to prove that the Borda rule and the Copeland rule verify a restricted
version of this property, namely restricted responsiveness: for every R′ ∈ L(X) and
R ∈W (X)N , Equation (2) holds eventually.
Lemma 1 The Borda rule and the Copeland rule verify restricted responsiveness.
Proof We fix X = {x1, ..., xk}, R′ ∈ L(X), and R ∈W (X)N .
Firstly we analyse the Borda rule. Given xs 6= xt we can assume xsP ′xt without
loss of generality. Now irrespective of the Borda score thatR attaches to them –namely,
βR(xs) and βR(xt)– it must be the case that for sufficiently large m the Borda score
with respect to Rm = R unionmulti R′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′ –which we denote by βRm– is strictly higher
for xs, since
βRm(xs)− βRm(xt) > m+ βR(xs)− βR(xt)
If m0 is such that m > m0 implies m+βR(xs)−βR(xt) > 0 then m > m0 implies that
the ordering between xs and xt according to Rm = RunionmultiR′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′ coincides with its
ordering according to R′. Because there are finitely many pairs in K, this conclusion
can be simultaneously reached for every pair xs 6= xt of elements in X.
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We now analyse the Copeland rule. Given xs 6= xt we can assume xsP ′xt without
loss of generality. It is clear that for sufficiently large m the alternative xs beats xt
by strict simple majority according to Rm = R unionmulti R′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′. Formally: denote by
κ′ the Copeland score of the profile with the linear order R′ only, and by κm the
Copeland score of the profile Rm, then κ′(xs) > κ′(xt) and it is eventually true that
κm(xs) = κ
′(xs) > κ′(xt) = κm(xt). Now the argument goes through as above. uunionsq
Responsiveness can not be guaranteed in Lemma 1: even in the simplest non-trivial
instance where there are two candidates both the Borda rule and the Copeland rule
fail to be responsive as the next Example shows.
Example 8 Suppose X = {x, y} thus k = 2. Let R = (R1) be the profile of one linear
order given by xP1 y . We also let R
′ be the complete preorder with x I ′ y , which is
not a linear order. Then CB(R unionmulti R′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′) = CC(R unionmulti R′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′) = R1 for
each m, that is, both the Borda and Copeland methods suggest the consensus ordering
R1 6= R′. The reason is that irrespective of m, the Borda score of x is a unit higher
than the Borda score of y, and the Copeland score of x is 1 but the Copeland score of
y is 0.
We are now ready to define:
Axiom 7 M verifies convergence to unanimity if for every R′ ∈W (X),
lim
m−→∞∇M(RunionmultiR
′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′) = 1
Axiom 8 M verifies restricted convergence to unanimity if for every R′ ∈ L(X) and
R ∈W (X)N , limm−→∞∇M(RunionmultiR′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′) = 1.
We proceed to ellucidate to which extent normal referenced consensus measures
verify convergence to unanimity, with an especial attention to the RCM-B and RCM-
C cases.
Proposition 7 Given M = (C, ∂pM), if C is responsive (resp., restrictedly responsive)
then M verifies Axiom 7 (resp., Axiom 8). In particular, RCM-B and RCM-C verify
restricted convergence to unanimity.
Proof Suppose C is responsive, that is, for every R′ ∈ W (X) and R ∈ W (X)N the
equality C(RunionmultiR′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′) = R′ is eventually true. Then one has
lim
m−→∞∇M(RunionmultiR
′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′) = lim
m−→∞ ∂
p
M(RunionmultiR′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′, C(RunionmultiR′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′))
= lim
m−→∞ ∂
p
M(RunionmultiR′ unionmulti m... unionmultiR′, R′)
= lim
m−→∞
(∑N
i=1M(Ri unionmultiR′)p +m
N +m
)1/p
= lim
m−→∞
(
N
N +m
[∂pM(R, R′)]p +
m
N +m
)1/p
= 1
where we are using that M(R′ unionmultiR′) = 1 and ∂pM(R, R′) 6 1.
The case of a restrictedly responsive consensus function is proved analogously.
In particular, from Lemma 1 RCM-B and RCM-C verify restricted convergence to
unanimity. uunionsq
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4.2 Other properties of referenced consensus measures
The literature on measurement of consensus has dealt with other desirable properties
that we briefly analyse in this Subsection. Axiom 9 below requests that null and full
consensus are possible.
Axiom 9 M verifies full range if there are two profiles R and R′ such that ∇M(R) =
0, ∇M(R′) = 1.
Neither RCM-B nor RCM-C verify this property in the sense that zero consensus
is impossible for particular values of N as seen in Subsection 3.4.
Similarly, we proceed to analyze the property of Monotonicity, whose formal def-
inition is given in Alcalde and Vorsatz [1]. Intuitively it say as follows. Suppose that
you measure the consensus in a society. Now one agent reverses her/his opinion about
the ordering of one particular pair of alternatives only. 3 If the alternative that the
agent favours after the change beats the other alternative in a pairwise comparison for
the rest of the society then the consensus should increase. And if both alternatives tie
in a pairwise comparison for the rest of the society then the consensus should not vary
after the change.
Examples 9 and 10 below show that RCM-B does not verify any of the two state-
ments that jointly define Monotonicity. The same goes for Examples 11 and 12 regard-
ing RCM-C.
Example 9 Suppose X = {x, y, z} thus k = 3. Let R = (R1, R2, R3) be the profile of
linear orders given by: y P1 xP1 z, xP2 y P2 z, y P3 z P3 x. Then CB(R) is P1, that is,
the Borda method produces P1. Some simple computations yield ∇MB (R) = 79 .
Consider the profile R′ = (R′1, R2, R3) where R′1 is the linear order y P ′1 z P ′1 x.
Under monotonicity this profile would have consensus 79 . However ∇MB (R′) = 59
because CB(R′) is the complete preorder R′ for which y P ′ x I ′ z .
Example 10 Suppose X = {x, y, z} thus k = 3. Let R = (R1, R2, R3) be the profile of
linear orders given by: y P1 xP1 z, z P2 xP2 y, y P3 z P3 x. Then CB(R) is P3, that is,
the Borda method produces P3. Some simple computations yield ∇MB (R) = 23 .
Consider the profile R′ = (R′1, R2, R3) where R′1 is the linear order y P ′1 z P ′1 x.
Under monotonicity this profile would yield a higher consensus. However∇MB (R′) = 59
because CB(R′) is the complete preorder R′ for which y I ′ z P ′ x .
Example 11 Suppose X = {x, y, z} thus k = 3. Let R = (R1, R2, R3) be the profile of
linear orders given by: xP1 y P1 z, y P2 xP2 z, z P3 y P3 x. Then CC(R) is P2, that is,
the Copeland method produces P2. Some simple computations yield ∇MC (R) = 23 .
Consider the profile R′ = (R′1, R2, R3) where R′1 is the linear order xP ′1 z P ′1 y. Un-
der monotonicity this profile would have consensus 23 . However ∇MC (R′) = 0 because
CC(R′) is the complete preorder R′ for which x I ′ y I ′ z .
3 Observe that this excludes from the analysis the case of a reversal of the order between x
and y e.g., in y I1 z P1 x or in y P1 z P1 x. These reversals modify the ordering between other
pairs of alternatives too.
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Example 12 Suppose X = {x, y, z} thus k = 3. Let R = (R1, R2, R3, R4) be the profile
of linear orders given by: xP1 y P1 z, xP2 y P2 z, z P3 xP3 y, z P4 xP4 y. Then CC(R)
is the linear order xP z P y (that is, the Copeland method produces P1). Some simple
computations yield ∇MC (R) = 23 .
Consider the profile R′ = (R′1, R2, R3, R4) where R′1 is the linear order whose
asymmetric part is P above (that is, xP ′1 z P ′1 y). Under monotonicity this profile would
yield a higher consensus. However ∇MC (R′) = 712 because CC(R′) is the complete
preorder R′ for which x I ′ z P ′ y .
5 Concluding remarks and future research
Alongside with normative approaches like the foundational Bosch [4] or Alcalde and
Vorsatz [2], in this paper we analyse the measurement of consensus from a descriptive
point of view. We have presented a general framework whose performance has been
explored. Also we have given two particular specifications that link this proposal to
voting theory. Some particular properties of theirs were presented too.
Our formulation permits to compare a finite list of proposals on a common ground
so that the society can decide which one conveys a higher consensus. Nonetheless its
primary objective is to assess the coherence within a society with reference to a given
voting rule. As is apparent, this may serve to discriminate among the voting rule that
should be selected if we aim at producing indisputable results.
Several questions remain open. Clearly, the performance of other measures with
reference to alternative voting rules is a direct variation of our analysis. Also, different
subclasses besides normal referenced consensus measures can yield a good normative
performance. The computational aspects of the notion can be explored too. Analogously
to the inspiring Saari [7] or Pritchard and Wilson [6], a more thorough inspection of
small sets of candidates (e.g., the three-alternative case) can shed light on the study.
This is a natural continuation of our Subsection 3.4. An ambitious project is the identi-
fication of the consensus function that yields the highest consensus as a function of the
consensus distance (or at least, for focal examples like ∂K) 4. Obviously when such pro-
cedure is used to make social decisions, the researcher can elaborate on manipulability
issues too.
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4 This has slight resemblances to the approach by Meskanen and Nurmi [5].
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